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Abstract- For managers in established firms the Internet is a
tough nut to crack.  It is simple to set up a web presence, but
difficult to create web-based business models.  The brave new
world of electronic commerce offers opportunities for
businesses to enter new markets, create new products and
deliver them in innovative ways.  However, these opportunities
can be threats.  A key threat to any business, almost regardless
of their place in the value chain, is disintermediation.
Suppliers, who may be current collaborators, find that they can
now reach customers directly.  While those supplying physical
goods face the risk of being 'disintermediated', the situation is
worse for businesses that deliver digital or at least digitisable
products.  This case analyses the response of one firm, Egmont,
to such threats and their quest for a new model upon which to
base their business.
I. PART A: INTRODUCTION
Egmont has a vision of providing consumers with quality
entertainment.  For example, Egmont publishes 70% of the
world's Disney stories, and it currently sells or rents about
half of all videos and 60% of all film tickets in Copenhagen.  In
1998, Egmont and Disney celebrated 50 years of co-operation,
which started with the publication of a monthly Donald Duck
comic in Sweden.  Today, Disney-Egmont co-operation
encompasses the publication of magazines and books in 28
countries.  Egmont's CEO, Jan Froeshaug, sees the Group's
unique competency as 'making great products'.  Egmont
'makes great products' primarily on the basis of rights,
characters and scripts licensed from content producers.  Their
key skill is in transformation where content is created and
leveraged internationally, but localised for different markets
Egmont is grappling with rapid changes in technology,
markets and competitors.  It has activities in all the stages of
the value chain.  However, as it is mainly an intermediary
transforming entertainment products, Egmont is squeezed
from both ends of its value chain - by originators and by
retailers and customers.
The entertainment sector faces rapid changes in both
delivery formats and business models.  Games, music and film
are increasingly downloaded directly from networks, so a
strong position in the Internet channel will be essential to
retain distribution rights.  The ability of interactive media to
track user behaviour and predict demand will enable the
sector to source better.  Yet, Ole Timm, Senior VP and
managing director of Egmont Entertainment (ENS) and
chairman of Egmont Online (EON) is reluctant to expand
rapidly investments in the Internet and commit EON fully to e-
commerce in entertainment products because of the risk of
channel conflicts and low current market volumes.
A . F i rm Background
Egmont, based in Denmark, is  Scandinavia's largest
entertainment media group with activities in 29 countries.  The
breadth, scale and international nature of Egmont's business
make it potentially a dominant player in interactive media.
Egmont's vision is to be a world-class media house providing
consumers with quality entertainment 'while they read, watch,
listen and play.'  According to Egmont's CEO Jan Froeshaug
the 'raison d'etre' of the Group is its unique competencies in
making entertainment products, focusing on children in
Europe and the whole family in Scandinavia.
B. Financial Situation
In 1998, Egmont's profit before tax and extraordinary items
was $46m (see Figure 1).  Group revenues increased by
approximately 6% to $1.1bn in 1998 (see Figure 2).  In 1998,
sales outside Denmark were 85% of the total.  Sales via
electronic media is expected to increase in line with industry
trends from 40% in 1998 to about 50% after 2000.
43
26
56
39
57
41 44
34
46
29
0
20
40
60
‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98
Profit
before
tax and
extraord
inary
items
Net profit
(Million $)
Fig. 1. Profit Before Tax and Extraordinary Items, 1994-1998 (Source:
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Fig. 2. Group Revenue, 1994-8 (Source: Egmont)
C. Organizational Structure
It all began with Egmont H. Petersen, who, at the age of
17, set up a printing shop in his mother's kitchen in
Copenhagen in 1878.  After his death in 1920, the company
became the Egmont Foundation, a charity generating funds
through commercial activities.  All commercial activities are
conducted through the Egmont Group, supervised by the
Foundation's Board of Trustees and are managed by a Group
Mangement Board.  Today, the Egmont Group comprises 107
active companies.  With a total of 4,047 employees, the
Egmont Group is structured in five main pillars, each
representing a business sector (see Figures 3, 4 and 5).
Egmont Magazines controls 1/3 of the weekly magazine
market in Scandinavia including 30 weekly and special interest
magazines with more than 5m weekly readers in Scandinavia.
Revenues were $240m in 1998.  In principle, each magazine
may transfer reader loyalty into interactive media, thus
extending and adding value to the print products.
Egmont Juvenile is Europe's largest publisher of comics
based on rights to exploit characters from Disney (now in 28
countries), King Features, Marvel, Mattel, Turner, Warner
and others.  Egmont Juvenile develops 18,000 pages of new
stories annually published in 30 countries with 1998 revenues
of $290m.  The stories are published in comics, albums and
pocket books, or adapted and published on audio cassettes
and CDs.  The publications are based on long-term licensing
agreements.  This high volume, multi-lingual content
production ability could provide the basis for an international
children's on-line service.  Egmont Juvenile has not been
content to stay within the confines of Europe and is
expanding in the Far East.  The entry of Egmont Juvenile to
the Japanese market was not easy.  The Japanese comics
market is the largest in the world and based on an Asian
narration form called 'manga', in which visual expression is
more important than text.  Consumers knew of Donald Duck
and Mickey Mouse from other products, but they did not
know them from comics.  Earlier attempts by other publishers
to launch comics in a European style were unsuccessful.
With support from both Japanese and European cartoonists,
Egmont spent more than two years recreating the 'Ducksberg
universe in manga style'.  The new, highly visual comics were
launched after thorough market testing, and should lead to
opportunities in other markets – initially in Asia.
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Fig. 3. Organizational Structure (Source: Egmont)
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Fig. 5. Annual Revenue per Business Sector (Source: Egmont)
Egmont Books operates in 25 countries with 1998
revenues of $233m. It is Europe's largest publisher of
children's books capturing more than 10% of the highly
fragmented European children's book market. Also, it is the
second largest publisher of adult books in Scandinavia.
Egmont Books includes 20 publishing houses and 58 book
clubs.  Distribution has grown from 5m to 60m books annually
in five years.  About 3,500 new titles are added every year and
distributed through book stores, kiosks, supermarkets,
department stores, catalogues and the Internet, as well as
through extensive book clubs.  For Egmont, it is important to
constantly strengthen its position in book publishing in order
to remain an attractive partner for authors, licensors, and the
retail trade.  Both acquisitions and organic growth have
characterised this development.  In 1998, Egmont launched a
children's Lego book club in the Danish and German-speaking
markets as a first step of strategic co-operation with Lego, a
co-operation that is foreseen not to remain limited to the
operation of a single book club.  Further, through active
support of Internet sales, both directly and indirectly, the
market for print publications could be increased opening up
new delivery formats such as digital books.
Nordisk Film & TV (NF&TV)  is one of Scandinavia's
largest suppliers of original film and TV titles and production
services.  Egmont Imagination is responsible for developing
new children's characters and managing their introduction
through the production of animated TV series for the global
market.  They co-own TV2 Norway and TV stations in
Sweden and Finland.  NF&TV is active in the production of
interactive content for the Internet and real-time 3D game
platforms.  These activities are not consolidated in the 1998
revenues shown in Figure 5.  1998 revenues from content
creation were $55m.  Enormous demand is anticipated as
Internet bandwidth expands and processor speeds increase to
provide a more TV-like interactive experience.
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Fig. 6. ENS Revenues and Profit (Source: Egmont)
Egmont Entertainment (ENS) is the leading distributor of
film, video and electronic games in Scandinavia.  Being
essentially a distribution business, it does not directly add
value through content creation, but only via marketing and
distribution of products.  Both films and electronic games are
marketed through the traditional video trade, in kiosks,
supermarkets and department stores, as well as increasingly
in electronics shops.  ENS operates its own distribution
company based on many years of co-operation with leading
film and electronic game producers such as Columbia Tristar,
20th Century Fox, Disney Interactive, and Sony.  The sector
also includes Denmark's largest chain of cinema theatres with
about 10,000 seats. 1998 revenues were $273m, making the
first profit for three years (see Figure 6).  For the first time
electronic games topped the list of revenues earners.
Overall, the Egmont Group has subsidiaries aiming to
provide world-class entertainment in very different
environments and media.  Egmont believes that this is best
done close to the customer.  However, Egmont strives to
connect their people across media and national borders to
enhance communication and competitiveness.  In 1998,
Egmont implemented an intranet, 'InSight', that facilitates
dialogue and information among Egmont's employees around
the clock.  InSight contains several thousand pages of
information helpful to Egmont's daily work.  Some of the many
networks, such as the Disney books and magazines, have
functioned for many years, while the Barbie network is recent.
Egmont's staff develops new ideas and improves shared
content in books and magazines across national borders –
Barbie is now  published by Egmont in 27 countries.
According to Egmont, 'networking has made personal training
and business development synonymous' (Egmont Annual
Report 1998).
II. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
Entertainment products face the most rapid changes in
both delivery formats and business models due to interactive
media.  Entertainment distribution is a 'fast moving' and 'hit-
driven' business where PC games, movies and videos quickly
become obsolete.  It requires strong management in product
sourcing, logistics, and marketing.  As games, music and film
are increasingly – though still at a rather low percentage -
downloaded directly from networks, a strong position in the
Internet channel may become essential to retain entertainment
profits.
The entertainment market is seeing an increasing shift
from print to electronic.  Yet, the print market is still growing
and will remain important for the foreseeable future (Figure 7).
Jupiter Communications forecasts rapid growth in on-line
purchasing from all sectors with music and entertainment
expected to be among the leaders (Figure 8).  While television
watching is expected to increase, the biggest changes in
spending leisure hours are predicted to be in  web surfing and
video games (Figure 9).  On-line content is forecasted to grow
and magazines are predicted to outstrip book growth as a
percentage of the total market.  However, on-line content is
expected to grow much beyond 1% market share by 2002
(Figure 10).  According to Jan Froshaug the data for 2002
represents the current habits of the 30% most web-active
consumers.  Egmont's research outlines that, after a period of
rapid growth, user on-line time will drop among heavy web-
users, as is already the case in Norway.  Further, their
investigations show that in the US few users visit more than
ten web-sites routinely.
Note: Enduser Spending US (Veronis & Suhler)
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I I I .  EN T E R T A I N M E N T  VALUE CHAIN IMPLICATIONS
There are essentially four elements in the entertainment
business value chain (Figure 11).  The chain starts with
originators that own the rights and the ideas.  This value
chain position is very lucrative; successful ideas often result
in large revenues and substantial profits but costs and risks
can be high too.  Originators sell licences to transformers.
Transformers make the rights and ideas into goods for sale.
The third value chain element are producers.  Typically, this
is a less profitable niche.  At the end of the value chain come
distribution and logistics, which may be offered by physical
retailers, mail order companies, or via electronic platforms
such as TV or online channels.  Physical or electronic
platforms almost 'own' the customer, but only after the
customer has chosen a retail outlet or TV station.  There is
strong concentration in this fixed-cost driven, highly
profitable sector (e.g. yahoo, TV stations, large department
stores).  Traditional retailers (especially membership-based
mail order companies and others who use special customer
cards) accumulate customer data, register purchase patterns,
and now use the Internet as a tool.  They foster distribution,
aiming for a margin in the last stage of the value chain.  For
instance, Boxman, a successful Swedish CD retailer on the
Web, does not own the rights to any of the music it sells.
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Fig. 11. The Entertainment Industry Value Chain
Question 1. How do you expect the market for Egmont's
products to change as use of the Internet
expands?  How will the skills Egmont
requires be affected?
Question 2. Where are Egmont's activities in the industry
value chain?  Assess the nature and extent of
competition and competitors at each stage of
the value chain.  How is it likely to change?
Who is likely to gain, who to lose?
Question 3. Entertainment firms depend on securing the
rights to content.  What will determine who
secures such rights in the Internet world?
Question 4. What competitive strategy would you advise
Egmont to follow?
IV. PART B: EGMONT ONLINE (ONL)
In 1996 Egmont established FunOnline, a children's
Internet community in Germany.  It was an initiative that
proved to be ahead of its time, costing Egmont $15m.  Parents
were uncomfortable with the new medium, its influence and
significance, fewer people had PCs at home, and the
technology was not as user-friendly as it is now.  FunOnline
was subsequently redefined and today is one of the most
visited sites in Germany; it is growing rapidly.  In December
1998, there were 300,000 page visits, while by August '99,
page visits amounted to 2.4m.  Many of the lessons learned
from the FunOnline venture formed the basis of Egmont's
subsequent investments in interactive media, especially
Egmont Online.
Egmont Online (ONL) was established to be the Group's
strategic investment in new technologies. It supplies
entertainment, news, information and advertising space to its
net communities.  ONL started in late 1996 supplying Internet
consulting services to Egmont companies.  In June 1997, ONL
shifted from consulting to developing and managing an
'interactive media platform' for the Egmont Group through
which 'Egmont-to-consumer services and products' could be
distributed.  The platform was launched in December 1997
under the name EON (Egmont Entertainment Network,
www.eon.dk).
In 1998, 100% Live was introduced to the market, a net TV
developed and operated in close co-operation with Nordisk
Film & TV.  Arguably the first Internet talkshow, 100% Live
allows viewers to direct their questions to the studio host and
guests via computer.  Pictures and sound are sent over the
Internet directly to home PCs.
In February 1998, Telia, the largest Scandinavian telco,
invested $2.5m for 33% of ONL.  In 1998, ONL had revenues
of approximately $1.4m and a net investment of about $2.6m.
By February 1999, net investment was $6m.
ONL's primary distribution channel is the Web Its two
primary media activities are EON and Netpool.  ONL's
platform EON is, primarily, a collection of on-line
communities.  By 1998, it had 325,000 monthly entries, 1.8m
monthly advertising exposures, and 53,000 registered
members.  Figures 12, 13, and 14 illustrate EON growth.  More
recently in 1999Q3 page views have soared from 0.25m to
1.2m.  EON's design and architecture are aimed at handling
business-to-consumer e-commerce for entertainment products
and services (magazines, books, CDs, tickets, videos etc.) as
soon as on-line markets and payment technologies have
matured.  Although currently only operating in Denmark, EON
has been developed as an international platform with the
potential to support Egmont businesses around the globe.
Currently EON is the only 'platform' of its kind in Denmark and
should be able to attract more channels.  The biggest task will
be to demonstrate to content owners that participation in
EON is worth giving up some control for.
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In April 1999, EON received an award for being the best
Internet service in Denmark.  H. Hojberg, head of the jury,
commented, 'EON has constantly developed its services in
time with the new opportunities the Internet provides.
There's no doubt that they will play a prominent role in the
future when competing for customers' interests.'
Netpool is a centralised advertising management and
sales organisation acting as a middleman between advertisers
and Web site owners. In 1998, ONL established Netpool
Denmark and acquired a stake in Netpool International.  ONL
is one of Netpool's largest clients.
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IV. ONL'S CO M P E T I T I V E  POSITION
There is fierce competition for the rights to the most
attractive assets on the Internet.  Most assets go to highest
bidder, hence a strong competitive position requires financial
strength and potential to get a return on the investment.  In
spite of overlaps, two aspects of competition are investigated:
(i) 'investment' and (ii) 'market share'.
A.  Investment
Like their US counterparts, Scandinavian media companies
are investing heavily in the Internet.  Through its investments
in Scandinavia-Online, Schibsted had a three-year head start
over Egmont, but their attempt to develop a pan-Scandinavian
service has not been successful so far.  Scandinavia-Online is
a general Internet business, and it is currently losing about
$15m per annum.  In 1998, Schibsted invested an estimated
$8.5m in the Danish market; more than three times ONL's
spend.  Another competitor, Kinnevik, operating in Denmark
as Tele2 and Get2Net, has acquired distribution rights for
Disney's Daily Blast for an estimated $1.8m, twice the price
Egmont felt it justified.  Egmont assessed that there is
insufficient return solely in distribution and did not attempt to
acquire the rights.  Tele2 is on track to become the highest-
profile Danish children's on-line media.  Additional threats
may stem from Bonniers and TV2, international competitors
with Wall Street funds, as well as from aggressive
Scandinavian start-ups such as the independent 'Jubii'.
International competitors funded by huge domestic
markets keep raising consumer expectations.  Firms must co-
operate to be profitable in interactive media.  As with
manufacturers that leverage R&D investments over broad
product lines, keeping up with the changing Internet requires
sharing investment across many interactive media products.
This is particularly important in small language markets such
as those in which ONL and many Egmont companies operate.
B. Market Share
Web sites struggle for market share.  The Danish market
has about 50 firms competing for the attention of 300,000
active (1-3 times per month) local Internet users and an on-
line advertising market of about $10m.  On average, there are
6,000 users and $0.2m of revenue per year per site -
insufficient to justify the investment required to run a high
quality independent site.
Market share estimates are unreliable, but ONL's EON
service is consistently highly rated for quantity.  Positive
press and strong partnerships have given ONL a reputation
for quality, fairness and foresight.  These will be essential for
maintaining trust and translating EON membership into a
market for other Egmont products.
By concentrating all responsibilities for banner sales in
Netpool, ONL has kick-started the Danish banner market, and
captured significant market share for ONL early on. By joining
a pan-Scandinavian alliance, it simultaneously reduced the
costs and risks.
C. A Promis ing  Start
 ONL has had successes, but for Egmont this is only one
step towards a new business model.  A major issue for
Egmont is how this step leads to the next.  Egmont recognises
that there are a number of potential next steps and that well-
considered steps may be better than premature leaps.  While
development of ONL and its subsidiary activities has
enhanced brands and built valuable knowledge of consumers
and their habits, Egmont could go further into e-commerce.
Question 5. How can Egmont best structure ONL to reap
group-wide synergies?
Question 6. ONL's business model covers three main
areas: (1) profiting from content and
distribution, (2) harvesting membership and
customer profiles, and (3) selling Internet
access.  Comment on how you would develop
each of these.
Question 7. ONL is a step towards a new business model
for Egmont.  It raises a number of
management problems concerning inter alia,
channel conflicts and internal structure and
co-ordination.  How might Egmont deal with
these?
V. PART C: NEXT  STEPS
A .  Towards E- commerce
 Egmont aims to operate EON as a strategically important
infrastructure for direct and on-line sales in order to foster e-
commerce in each of its five business sectors 'whenever the
market will suggest and demand it' (Jan Froeshaug).  Egmont's
CEO believes the e-commerce market is not large enough, yet.
Hence, Egmont's strategy is to start by bringing their clubs
on-line.  Profits from this are booked to the clubs, not to ONL.
 The clubs have about 250,000 members in Denmark (in
total they have over 1 million members in book clubs and
more than 1.5 million in all clubs).  They offer focussed
product lines (unlike general book retailers), but stock
thousands of copies of best-selling titles.  Typically, clubs
sell about 60,000-70,000 copies of each best-seller, an average
'non-club' title sells about 1,000-5,000 in Denmark.  Currently,
about 30% of book club customers use the Web.  Egmont
management supports all Egmont clubs being available on the
Web through ONL or directly through the club's web address.
In this model, ONL lets (potential) customers learn about
Egmont products, buy tickets to movies, order books etc., and
to chat about all the available products.  Besides 'racking', the
clubs heavily contributed to Egmont's year-long experience
with direct sales and the according logistic challenges.  For
instance, in 1998, around 60% of Egmont Entertainment
(ENS)'s sales were indirect (via video stores, other retailers,
and mass distribution) and 40% direct (through clubs and
racking companies). Direct selling experience is one of
Egmont's strongest assets , direct sales require skills in
physical distribution that Egmont already has in place.
 In Denmark, Egmont controls the largest book and video
clubs. Hence, it has access to consumers, both targeted
consumer groups through clubs and more general consumers,
Egmont and Bonnier vie for the prime club spot in
Scandinavia.
 In Sweden and Denmark, Egmont has distribution and
logistics centres where orders are handled and shipped to
retail and consumers.  In Koege, not far from Copenhagen,
Egmont has the most modern itemised delivery system in
Scandinavia with completely automated processes. The
system has recently been identified as an example of good
practice by Disney.
 Clubs sell direct; however, they are mainly mail order,
despite more transaction phases being offered and/or
executed via the Internet. Egmont's CEO, Jan Froeshaug,
comments, 'just using the Internet for the "club business" is
not sufficient to term it "e-commerce".  "True" e-commerce
requires on-line sales – direct or indirect'.
 Aside from successfully setting up the interactive media
platform EON, e-commerce presents other challenges to
Egmont.
· Internet projects are capital intensive compared to
Egmont's usual investments and riskier. As a
foundation, Egmont has little experience of
financing 'risky' investments on the stock market.
Risk sharing with a partner implies some loss of
control over the project.
· Egmont is a decentralised, profit-centre-based
organisation that may find difficulty in realising
group synergies and jointly leveraging assets.
"There is no uniform recipe for growth. This also
applies to Egmont where companies devise widely
different growth strategies" (Egmont, Annual
Report 1998, p.18).
· Building direct sales channels implies the risk of
channel conflicts.  Egmont's current Internet
strategy involves building a direct sales channel.
The Entertainment and Books sectors are dominant
distributors and they fear that selling directly on-
line will violate retail relations.  On the other hand,
Egmont already operates various direct sales
businesses in Entertainment and Books in the form
of clubs, mail order and racking.  Competitors with
similar vision and ambitions are already taking
market share and building relationships with
'Egmont customers'.  Egmont must be prepared to
face retaliation from retailers (and competitors) via
exclusion from certain retail chains, price
competition and favouring of competitors.  The
reactions may be alleviated by carefully managing
e-commerce initiatives so retailers see it as a
necessity for Egmont. Consolidation in retailing
and on-line services implies fewer, stronger
retailers that might out-bargain Egmont against
producers and/or make themselves unavoidable for
Egmont.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
 Due to the rapid development, staggering impact and
hype of the Internet, few firms yet have a clear picture of, and
strategy for, a digital future and its business potential.  The
debate over 'early mover' versus 'wait and see' is unresolved.
It remains to be seen how quickly consumers will shift to
Internet buying and if advertisers will move media budgets
on-line.  Decision aids such as business experience, track
records or benchmarks are unavailable.  Technology is
making current business models obsolete, allowing new (and
unforeseen) competitors to steal competitive edges.  Yet
technology can only go so far.  Trust and relationships may
be the key to the next wave as the technology become
ubiquitous.  Consumers can be empowered by the web, but
loyalty and habit in buying patterns gives existing vendors an
advantage.  It has never hurt any business to know its
customers and Egmont, demonstrates that this is more
important than ever.  Customers can only drive technologies
and businesses that are there and willing to be driven.  If
customers are 'doing the driving' then flexibility in strategy,
operations, processes, systems and technology come to the
fore.
 Egmont's industry is changing rapidly, with electronic
media growing quickly and printed media stagnating.  Egmont
can grow in printed media from increasing market share
through innovation, geographic expansion and acquisitions,
but the real growth prospects are in electronic media.  The
Group will continue to invest in new concepts, products and
markets but the investment demands of this are high.
 Egmont's CEO considers few players, especially in the
entertainment sector, have found a successful and stable
business model.  Egmont has made a deliberate choice not to
be first mover.  Jan Froeshaug considers that there is the
potential to lose a lot of business for a small Internet market.
Hence, Egmonts's strategy is to be ready and to be flexible so
that if, and when, the market turns into something big,
Egmont can be a rapid entrant.
This case demonstrates how rapid changes in industry
sectors and threats such as disintermediation can be
countered by forward-thinking, innovative strategies and a
technological solution in on-line, entertainment sales.
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Note
Some exhibits have been omitted from the teaching case in
order to suit the ECIS page constraint.  A 12-page Teaching
Note including additional 7 exhibits / slides is available to
instructors upon request.
